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INTRODUCTION 
 
The process of federal judicial selection1 has become overtly 
ideological.  Political ideology has played an important role in judicial 
selection, from John Adams’s entrenchment of federalists as judges 
after the election of 1800 to Roosevelt’s selection of progressives, 
liberals, and New Dealers to the contemporary era highlighted by the 
failed nominations of Fortas, Haynsworth, Carswell, the defeat of 
Robert Bork, and the narrow confirmation of Clarence Thomas.  But 
until recently, political ideology has played its role behind the scenes—
mostly off the record of the judicial nomination and confirmation 
process.  As recently as 1997, Sheldon Goldman could observe that 
while the nomination of a Supreme Court Justice is big news, 
“throughout American history we find little such national attention 
given to the selection of lower federal court judges.”2  But recently, 
political ideology has taken center stage.  The recent history of 
Republican obstruction of several Clinton nominees, the Democratic 
filibuster of several Bush nominees, and most recently, Bush’s use of 
the recess appointments power to circumvent the filibusters is evidence 
that the role of political ideology as the explicit focus of judicial 
selection seems to be waxing rather than waning. 
Perhaps the most important evidence of the new emphasis on 
political ideology in judicial selection is Senator Charles Schumer’s op-
ed Judging by Ideology,3 which argued for the proposition that political 
ideology and not character or competence should be the explicit basis 
for Democratic opposition to Republican judicial nominees.  In the legal 
academy, Jack Balkin (sometimes with co-author Sandy Levinson) has 
argued that constitutional change has been and legitimately should be 
accomplished through ideological appointments to the Supreme Court.4  
 
 1 The literature on judicial selection is too large to summarize. See, e.g., HENRY J. 
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE 
SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 1992); HENRY J. ABRAHAM ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, 
IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS (1990); SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER 
COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, 
THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 93-97 (1995); GEORGE WATSON & JOHN A. 
STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS (1995); THE 
JUDGES WAR: THE SENATE, LEGAL CULTURE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND JUDICIAL 
CONFIRMATION (Patrick B. McGuigan & Jeffrey P. O’Connell eds., 1987). 
 2 See GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 1. 
 3 Charles E. Schumer, Judging By Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at A19. 
 4 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding The Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); see also Jack Balkin, Good Judging and “Following the Rules Laid 
Down, at http://www.balkin.blogspot.com/2003_05_18_balkin_archive.html#94523316; Jack 
Balkin, Good Judging and “Following the Rules Laid Down,” Part II, at http://www.balkin. 
blogspot.com/2003_05_18_balkin_archive.html#94561782.  But see Lawrence B. Solum, 
Judicial Integrity, Legal Realism, and the Second Amendment: A Commentary on Lazarus and 
Kozinski, at http://www.lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#200304841; 
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Although legal realism has always played a role in the judicial selection 
process, these developments signal a realist turn, from a prior practice 
that emphasized competence and character as the overt criteria for 
judicial selection to an emerging practice that explicitly acknowledges 
ideological appointments as a legitimate basis for changing the law 
without amending the Constitution or enacting new statutes. 
Not surprisingly, this realist turn in judicial selection has raised the 
political stakes for the President, senators, and interest groups.  Recent 
events, particularly the filibuster of several judicial nominees and the 
use of the recess appointments power to circumvent the filibusters, may 
constitute a downward spiral of politicization.5  Of course, the judicial 
selection process is part of a complex political system.  The polarization 
of the judicial selection process may, in part, be driven by larger forces, 
and in particular, by the general trend toward polarization of the 
political parties and political ideology.6  But whatever the causes of the 
downward spiral of politicization that has characterized the judicial 
selection process, this phenomenon is surely of interest to normative 
and explanatory legal theory. 
This Article argues for an old-fashioned position,7 dressed up in 
somewhat new-fangled clothes: character should be of primary 
importance in the judicial selection process,8 and political ideology 
should play a relatively minor role.  It will come as no surprise that 
these simple assertions stand in for more complex positions, but in the 
end, they capture important truths.  Any sensible normative theory of 
judicial selection must admit that character counts.  It is very hard to 
defend the proposition that we should select judges with truly bad 
characters but good ideologies.  The real question is whether there is a 
tenable argument for the proposition that we should select judges whose 
 
Lawrence B. Solum, A Neoformalist Manifesto, at http://www.lsolum.blogspot.com/ 
2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#200307682; Lawrence B. Solum, Fear and Loathing in New 
Haven, at http://www.lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#200315303. 
 5 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994); John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal 
Judicial Appointments Process under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 1 (2003). 
 6 Richard Fleisher & Jon R. Bond, Congress and the President in a Partisan Era, in 
POLARIZED POLITICS: CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA 1-8 (Jon R. Bond & 
Richard Fleisher eds., CQ Press 2000). 
 7 The notion that judicial selection should focus on character goes back to the founding.  For 
example, James Madison stated that the primary reason behind senatorial participation in the 
appointments process was that senators would be better informed about the characters of the 
candidates.  See MAX FARRAND, 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 357 
(2d ed. 1937).  Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers that the Senate’s confirmation 
power “would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend 
greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit characters . . . .” THE FEDERALIST No. 76 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
 8 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to 
Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988); see also CARTER, supra note 5. 
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ideologies we dislike but whose characters we admire.  This Article 
argues for an affirmative answer to that question: we ought to adopt an 
aretaic9 approach to judicial selection. 
The case for a character-focused approach to judicial selection can 
be made in a variety of ways.  One line of argument begins in moral 
theory.  Fundamental debates at the deepest levels of moral theory have 
interesting parallels to debates about judging and judicial selection.  The 
argument for the primacy of character in judicial selection could begin 
with the premise that character is fundamental in ethics and morality.  If 
virtue ethics10 provides the best account of morality, the argument goes, 
one ought to be able to show that candidates for judicial office should 
be selected for their possession of the judicial virtues.  We might 
summarize this argumentative strategy with the slogan: virtue ethics 
implies virtue jurisprudence.  That is not the strategy that I will pursue 
in this Article.  Rather, my argument will proceed in the opposite 
direction.  I will begin with the case that ideology rather than character 
should be the primary criterion for judicial selection.  I will try to show 
how the premises that underlie the case for ideological selection of 
judges might actually turn out to be consistent with the case for the 
selection of judges on the basis of character. 
Along the way, I will explore the current political controversy over 
the selection of federal judges, using the views of Senator Charles 
Schumer as my foil.  I will then present a simple two-dimensional 
model of judicial dispositions or attitudes and show how that model 
might lead to view that judges should be selected based on their 
ideologies.  After presenting the case against character, I will try to 
 
 9 Arete is the ancient Greek word for excellence.  An aretaic moral theory focuses on 
excellences and deficiencies of human character.  An aretaic theory of constitutional 
interpretation focuses on the excellences and deficiencies of officials, characteristically judges, 
who engage in the practice of constitutional interpretation.  Aretaic is thus a synonym for 
“excellence focused.”  The Greek aretaic is frequently translated as “virtue” from virtu the 
standard Latin translation for arete. See generally Aretaic Turn, at http://www.en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Aretaic_turn (last visited February 27, 2004) (“In moral philosophy, the phrase aretaic turn 
refers to the renewed emphasis on human excellence or virtue in moral theory and ethics.”). 
 10 See, e.g., PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS (2001); PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND 
VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1978); ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON 
VIRTUE ETHICS (1999); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 
(2d ed. 1984); NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF 
VIRTUE (1989); CHRISTINE SWANTON, VIRTUE ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC VIEW (2003); see also 
VIRTUE ETHICS: (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1997); VIRTUE ETHICS: (Daniel Statman ed., 
1997); HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE?: ESSAYS ON THE VIRTUES (Roger Crisp. ed., 1996); Arthur 
Flemming, Reviving the Virtues, 90 ETHICS 587 (1980); Gregory E. Pence, Recent Work on 
Virtues, 21 AM. PHIL. Q. 281 (1984); Greg Pence, Virtue Theory, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 
249 (Peter Singer ed., 1991); Marcia Baron, Varieties of Ethics of Virtue, 22 AM. PHIL. Q. 47 
(1985); Gregory Trianosky, What Is Virtue Ethics All About?, 27 AM. PHIL. Q. 335 (1990); 
Phillip Montague, Virtue Ethics: A Qualified Success Story, 29 AM. PHIL. Q. 53 (1992).  For an 
article on the history of virtue ethics, see Richard White, Historical Perspectives on the Morality 
of Virtue, 25 J. VALUE  INQUIRY 217 (1991). 
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present the case for character in a way that is consistent with the 
premises of the ideological view.  This involves the introduction of a 
thin theory of judicial vice, followed by a thin theory of judicial virtue, 
leading to a discussion of the virtue of justice, and finally to my 
argument that we should select judges who possess the judicial virtues.  
The key to my argument will be an account of the virtue of justice. 
 
I.     THE CASE FOR IDEOLOGY: A REALIST THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
SELECTION 
 
We begin with the case against character and for ideology as the 
primary criterion for judicial selection.  How might we come to think 
the traditional judicial virtues (judicial temperament, civic courage, 
judicial intelligence, practical wisdom, and so forth11) should not be the 
focus of the judicial selection process?  To answer this question, let us 
begin with the contemporary political debates over the judicial 
nomination process. 
 
A.     Senator Schumer and the Realist Turn in Judicial Selection 
 
In an influential op-ed essay in the New York Times, Senator 
Charles Schumer has argued that ideology rather than character should 
be the explicit focus on judicial selection.  He began his argument with 
the following observation: 
For one reason or another, examining the ideologies of judicial 
nominees has become something of a Senate taboo.  In part out of a 
fear of being labeled partisan, senators have driven legitimate 
consideration and discussion of ideology underground.  The not-so-
dirty little secret of the Senate is that we do consider ideology, but 
privately.12 
  Unfortunately, the taboo has led senators who oppose a nominee 
for ideological reasons to justify their opposition by finding 
nonideological factors, like small financial improprieties from long 
ago.  This “gotcha” politics has warped the confirmation process and 
harmed the Senate’s reputation.13 
And, Schumer continued: 
 
 11 See Solum, supra note 8; Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered 
Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003) reprinted in MORAL AND EPISTEMIC 
VIRTUES (Michael Brady & Duncan Prichard eds. 2003) [hereinafter, Solum, Virtue 
Jurisprudence]; Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, in NOMOS XXXVI: THE RULE 
OF LAW 120 (1994) [hereinafter, Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law]. 
 12 Schumer, supra note 3. 
 13 Id. 
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[S]ince Judge Robert Bork’s nomination was defeated in 1987 
largely because of his positions on abortion, civil rights and civil 
liberties, ideology has played more of a behind-the-scenes role in 
nomination hearings.  It would be best for the Senate, the president’s 
nominees and the country if we return to a more open and rational 
debate about ideology when we consider nominees.14 
I come to bury Schumer, not to praise him.  But before I begin my 
critique, I should note one important issue upon which Schumer and I 
agree.  If ideology is to play a role in judicial selection, that role should 
be transparent and not covert.15  With that out of the way, let me say a 
few words about the political context of the current controversy over 
judicial selection. 
 
B.     The Context for the Realist Turn 
 
Schumer’s remarks have become very important in current debates 
about the judicial selection process.16  This importance is, in part, a 
function of the constellation of party control of the Senate and the 
presidency.  With a Republican President and a Republican majority in 
the Senate, one might expect that the Senate would confirm almost all 
of the President’s nominees—barring of course, scandal or personal 
opposition by a senator from the state in which the nominee will sit.  
But the Republican majority in the Senate is thin, short of the sixty 
votes necessary for cloture.  Lead by Senator Schumer, Democrats have 
filibustered a small number of judicial nominees, including Miguel 
Estrada,17 Priscilla Owen,18 and Bill Pryor.19  This has led to a 
 
 14 Id. 
 15 Three reasons for this conclusion are: (1) As Schumer notes, if ideology is the driving force 
but excluded from public debate, then character assassination may be the tool for advancing 
ideology.  This is harmful to the individuals involved and may discourage qualified candidates 
from accepting nominations, id.; (2) Public debate and discussion of the judicial selection will be 
enhanced by open acknowledgement of the role of ideology the nomination and confirmation of 
judges; and (3) Dissimulation and deception in public debate is an evil in itself. 
 16 Schumer elaborated on the themes in his New York Times editorial in hearings before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights, of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary. See Charles Schumer, Judicial Nominations, Filibusters, and the Constitution: 
When a Majority Is Denied Its Right to Consent, at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearing.cfm?id=744 (indicating Schumer’s presence on the panel as a witness); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Blogging from the Senate Judiciary Hearing Room, at http://www.lsolum.blog 
spot.com/2003_05_01_lsolum_archive.html#200252231 (May 6, 2003) (reporting on Schumer’s 
testimony). 
 17 Jesse J. Holland, Filibuster Continues on Hispanic Nominee, KANSAS CITY STAR, July 31, 
2003, at http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/breaking_news/6420135.htm?template 
=contentModules/printstory.jsp. 
 18 Senate Democrats Stall Bush Nominee Again, Fox News Channel, July 29, 2003, at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,93226,00.html. 
 19 Andrew Mollison, Court Nominee Draws Spotlight in Ala. Saga, ATLANTA J. & CONST., 
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contentious partisan struggle.  The Republican Senate leadership has 
discussed the nuclear option—essentially the use of parliamentary 
maneuvers to circumvent the filibuster.20  Others have suggested that 
the President could make extensive use of the Recess Appointments 
Clause to circumvent the Democrats use of the filibuster.21  In this 
context, the question as to the proper roles of ideology and character in 
the judicial selection process has come to the fore. 
Another word about context is required before I get on to the core 
of my argument.  The role of character and ideology in judicial selection 
are likely to vary with political circumstances.  Senator Schumer made 
this point in his editorial, using the Eisenhower presidency as an 
illustration of his point: 
How important should ideology be in the confirmation decision?  
The answer can vary depending on three factors: the extent to which 
the president himself makes his initial selections on the basis of a 
particular ideology, the composition of the courts at the time of 
nomination and the political climate of the day. 
  During the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, political 
ideology played a lesser role in the confirmation hearings. 
Eisenhower had been elected by overwhelming majorities in both 
1952 and 1956, while the Senate was closely divided and four out of 
every five federal judges were Democrats. 
  Moreover, Eisenhower sought candidates with, as he put it, “solid 
common sense,” eschewing candidates with “extreme legal or 
philosophical views.”  And he asked the American Bar Association 
for its evaluation of potential nominees. Thus, in a time when the 
courts were dominated by Democrats, a split Senate had little reason 
to oppose the nonideological nominees of an overwhelmingly 
popular Republican president.22 
In a footnote, I flesh out Schumer’s point, just a bit, by laying out 
three scenarios, involving the relationships of ideological factions23 to 
control of the presidency and the Senate.24  Finally, in this essay, I lay to 
 
August 22, 2003, at A13. 
 20 Geoff Earle and Sarita Chourey, ‘Nuclear’ Option Retained to Break Filibuster, THE HILL, 
June 25, 2003, at 18. 
 21 Randy E. Barnett, Benching Bork, National Review Online, Apr. 29, 2003, at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-barnett042903.asp. 
 22 Schumer, supra note 16. 
 23 By “ideological faction,” I simply mean a group (for example, a political party or other 
political grouping) that can be identified as a significant actor in the political process generally 
and the judicial selection process in particular. 
 24 Here are the scenarios: 
1. One Faction Controls the Presidency and Has a Super-Majority of the Senate. Under 
these circumstances, the dominant ideological faction would have the power to select 
judges whose judicial philosophies and political ideologies were congruent with the 
aims of the faction. 
2. Different Factions Control the Presidency and the Senate.  Given this scenario, neither 
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one side the possibility that the judicial selection process is driven by its 
effects on electoral politics.25 
 
C.     A Simple Model of Judicial Attitudes and Dispositions 
 
My next task is to present a simple model of judicial attitudes and 
dispositions.26  The model begins with political ideology.  The story 
about judicial selection that I will tell uses a very simple, one-
dimensional, left-to-right continuum to represent political ideology.  
This model assumes that each judge has dispositions to exercise judicial 
power in accord with her political ideology (her beliefs and attitudes 
about politics).  Thus, each judge occupies some point on a real line 
from left to right. 
 
Figure 1     One-Dimensional Model: 
 
 
Just as judicial candidates occupy a point on this line, so do other 
political actors, e.g., the President and senators. 
In the real world, of course, political ideology is multidimensional.  
For example, the political right includes both moral conservatives and 
libertarians.  So, this model presents an absurdly simple picture of 
political ideology, but let us put that issue aside at this point.27  If we 
assume that the President and senators select judges solely on the basis 
 
faction can impose its will on the other.  The Senate can reject presidential nominees, 
but cannot select judges on its own.  The President can make recess appointments, but 
these appointments expire at the end of the following term of the Senate. 
3. One Faction Controls the Presidency and Has a Simple Majority in the Senate.  This is 
approximately the current situation.  A concerted minority can block nominations, 
unless the majority is willing to alter the filibuster rule.  As in two, the President can 
make recess appointments. 
In addition, the political ideology of judges may become particularly important during periods of 
political transition.  See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Appointments and the Presidential Agenda, 
in THE PRESIDENCY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Paul Brace et al. eds., 1989); GOLDMAN, supra note 
1, at 4. 
 25 See GOLDMAN, supra note 1, at 3 (distinguishing the “policy agenda” and the “partisan 
agenda” of the President, with the latter representing electoral concerns). 
 26 By “judicial dispositions,” I mean the stable tendencies of judges to decide cases in 
particular ways.  Given the simple left/right model of political ideology, this translates in to 
dispositions to vote in ways conforming to a particular point on the ideology spectrum. 
 27 So far as I can tell, nothing in my argument would be affected by the substitution of a 
richer, more accurate model of political ideology. 
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of their ideology, this informal model might lead to the conclusion that 
when both sides have the ability to block nominations but only the 
president can nominate, candidates would be selected from somewhere 
near the right of the political center.  As the first mover, the president 
has an advantage in the judicial selection game. 
There is another dimension of judicial disposition to consider.  Let 
us construct a very simple model of judicial philosophy.  Let us assume 
that we can plot a candidate’s judicial philosophy as a point on a 
continuum from realist to formalist, as illustrated by Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2      One-Dimensional Model: Judicial Philosophy 
 
 
Stipulate that the most extreme realist judge views the law as 
purely instrumental, and is willing to decide cases on purely ideological 
grounds.  By similar stipulation, the most extreme formalist judge 
decides cases entirely on the basis of the authoritative legal sources (the 
text of the constitution and statutes and stare decisis).  Of course, in the 
real world, judicial philosophies are not so simple.  There are many 
varieties of realism and formalism; more importantly, there are other 
normative theories of judging that are not easily captured by this 
continuum.28  Again, let us bracket this concern.29 
 
 28 For example, Ronald Dworkin’s theory is not well captured by this simple model.  See 
RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); see also RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
 29 In her oral comments when this paper was presented at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law, Dawn Johnsen suggested that the two-dimensional model (political ideology and judicial 
philosophy) should be replaced by a different metric that Professor Johnsen labeled “judicial 
ideology.”  See Dawn Johnsen, Should Ideology Matter in Selecting Federal Judges?: Ground 
Rules for the Debate, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 465 (2005).  My view is that this move is 
troublesome for two reasons.  First, the notion of “judicial ideology” is not well defined.  Even 
the two-dimensional model is extremely simplified.  Without further clarification, the one-
dimensional model seems to obscure rather than clarify judicial dispositions and attitudes.  
Second, the “judicial ideology” label obscures the nature of both dimensions of judicial 
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When our two simple models combine, we have a two-dimensional 
space, with each judge’s attitudes and dispositions occupying a point in 
that space as represented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3     Two-Dimensional Model: Political Ideology and 
Judicial Philosophy 
 
 
If we assume that the two dimensions are independent of one 
another,30 then in theory a judge could occupy any point in two-
dimensional space.  Notice that judges who occupy distant points on the 
plane may reach the same result in particular cases, although the 
explanation (or reason) will be different.  For example, a right-formalist 
judge might reach the same result as a left-realist judge in a case 
involving the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrine of constitutional 
sovereign immunity of states from suit in federal court.  Suppose, for 
example, that a left-realist judge decides to limit the constitutional 
sovereign immunity of the states on the ground that such immunity 
interfered with the enforcement of federal civil rights, and a right-
formalist judge reached the same result on the ground that there is no 
grant of sovereign immunity to the states in the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment or elsewhere in the Constitution.  Each judge reaches the 
same outcome on the basis of different dispositions and attitudes. 
Let us make another simplifying assumption: that formalist judging 
is politically neutral.  That is, let us assume that deciding cases in 
 
disposition. 
 30 This assumption is controversial.  For example, some may believe that formalism 
systematically favors the political right.  “Originalism,” a formalist methodology for 
constitutional interpretation, is frequently associated with the political right on issues such as 
federalism and substantive due process.  The “living constitution” or “contemporary ratification” 
approach is sometimes associated with the political left.  But, this story is too simple.  If 
formalism includes a strong doctrine of stare decisis (as I think it does), then the story becomes 
more complicated, as many Warren and Burger Court decisions and even some Rehnquist Court 
decisions are supported by the political left. 
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accord with the authoritative legal texts produces outcomes that are 
randomly distributed along the left-to-right political line.31  As a 
consequence, both those on the extreme left and the extreme right of the 
political spectrum are indifferent between a perfectly realist judge who 
occupies a position at the center of the political ideology line and a 
perfectly formalist judge who occupies any position on the political 
ideology line.32 
 
D.     Implications of the Model: The Case for Ideological Selection of 
Judges 
 
Our two-dimensional model allows us to tell a simplified story 
about how political actors ought to select judges, given a particular set 
of political circumstances.  We begin by setting aside ultimate questions 
about the correctness of political ideologies.  We assume that both left 
and right believe that their ideology is correct as a matter of political 
morality.  Further, let us assume that political circumstances are roughly 
those that prevail today.  That is, the successful appointment of a judge 
requires cooperation from the right (which controls the presidency and 
Senate majority) and the left (which controls a Senate minority 
sufficient to block a nominee by filibuster). 
Under these circumstances, from the point of view of the left, the 
best move would be to filibuster judicial nominees who have both a 
right-wing political orientation and a realist judicial philosophy.  Of 
course, the right would be unwilling to nominate left-realist candidates.  
Assuming that both sides have an interest in avoiding deadlock, we 
would expect that a compromise would be reached, allowing the right to 
select judicial candidates who are realist and politically centrist and/or 
candidates who are formalist and politically right wing.  We can posit 
an indifference frontier of judges who are acceptable to the left—as 
candidates move to the right of the political center, the frontier moves 
towards the formalist pole of the judicial philosophy axis.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 31 This assumption may well be wrong.  For example, it may well be the case that the 
authoritative political materials generally favor centrist outcomes.  In that case, formalist judging 
would frequently approximate realist-centrist judging. 
 32 Extreme politicians will be indifferent as between a realist-centrist and perfect formalist 
because their mean political ideology scores would be identical.  Not everyone will be indifferent, 
however.  Someone who is ideologically centrist would prefer a realist-centrist judge to a 
formalist judge (regardless of the formalist judge’s position on the left-to-right political ideology 
line.  Realist-centrist judges are disposed to reliably make decisions that accord with centrist 
political ideology.  If we assume that formalism is politically neutral, then formalist judges will 
make left, right, and centrist decisions.  Centrists will prefer formalist judges to right-realists and 
left-realists, but not centrist realists. 
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Figure 4      Left Indifference Frontier: 
Political Ideology and Judicial Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 4, candidates who are acceptable to the left are below and 
to the right of the upward sloping indifference curve that marks the 
acceptability frontier.  As candidates move the right on the political 
ideology line, they must be more formalist to be acceptable.  As they 
move up on the realist to formalist line positions further and further to 
right are inside the acceptability frontier. 
Let us assume that the indifference frontier of the right is 
symmetrical.  This gives us Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5     Right Indifference Frontier: 
Political Ideology and Judicial Philosophy 
 
 
 
If we combine the two acceptability frontiers, we get the space that 
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defines the set of judicial candidates who can be both nominated and 
confirmed, given that either the left or the right can block a candidate.  
This is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6     Confirmable Candidates: 
Political Ideology and Judicial Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model predicts that judges will be selected from within the zone of 
confirmable candidates, but it does not tell us which confirmable 
candidates will actually be nominated and selected.  Since the President 
moves first, we would predict that a right-wing President would 
nominate candidates located on the indifference curve sloping 
downward from right to left that is closest to the President’s own 
position but still contains points that are inside the left-wing Senate 
minority’s acceptability frontier.  More simply, of those candidates 
whose dispositions and attitudes are acceptable to the Senate minority, 
the President will nominate the dispositions that will produce mean 
outcomes as close as possible to the outcomes favored by the 
President’s own political ideology. 
My very simple story gets quite complex if we relax the 
simplifying assumptions in the model.  Here are some examples: 
• The left and the right are not unitary actors.  We can 
disaggregate the right into the Senate majority and the 
President, with distinct ideologies and interests in 
reelection.  Further disaggregation might identify distinct 
groups within both the Senate and the executive branch. 
• The left and the right may have different perceptions of a 
given judicial candidates position in the two-dimensional 
space.  For example, the left may perceive a candidate as a 
realist, while the right perceives the same candidate as a 
formalist.  In this situation, the two sides might disagree on 
what constitutes a fair compromise given the ability of the 
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left to block right’s candidates.33 
• Both political ideology and judicial philosophy are 
multidimensional, and hence the dispositions of actual 
judges are located in a complex multidimensional space. 
• Formalist judging may not be ideologically neutral.  Judges 
who decide on the basis of authoritative legal texts may 
systematically favor one ideology over the other.34 
• Information about the position of judges on the two-
dimensional plane may be imperfect. A seemingly 
formalist judge might turn out to be realist.  A seemingly 
centrist judge might turn out to be an ideological extremist. 
If the simplified model (partially but meaningfully) captures the 
judicial selection process, it follows that from the point of view of the 
participants, there are two important dispositional characteristics in 
candidates for judicial office, judicial philosophy and political ideology.  
The goal of each side would be to get their own realists on the courts 
and to block the realists for the other side.  When the left controls the 
presidency, their goal is to appoint judges who are as left-realist as 
possible.  When the left is in the blocking position, their goal is to force 
the right to accept either political centrists or formalists—and vice versa 
for the right. 
Of course, the outcome of the game will depend on political 
circumstances.  If one side were to gain control of both the presidency 
and a super-majority in the Senate, that side would be able to appoint its 
own realist judges to the Court.35  So long as both parties must 
cooperate, we would expect that only centrist or formalist judges would 
be selected. 
Setting these complications aside, the normative implications of 
the simple model seem to be obvious.  If you believe that your political 
ideology is normatively correct, it would seem to follow that you should 
select judges who are as close as possible to being perfectly realist and 
matching your own position on the ideological spectrum.  If your first-
 
 33 In other words, there might be either asymmetrical information or asymmetrical 
perceptions or both. 
 34 In discussions of the themes of this paper, several colleagues have suggested that formalist 
judging systematically favors the right in current political circumstances.  In my opinion, this 
perception is based on the notion that the Warren and Burger Court legacy cannot be justified on 
formalist grounds.  I have grave doubts about these issues, but they are outside the scope of this 
paper. 
 35 Whether a party with effective control over the selection process would select realist judges 
is itself a complex problem.  If the party believed that its super-majority position would persist 
over time, then the institutional interests of the political branches might lead to the selection of 
formalist judges, who would be more faithful to the political decisions reached by the other 
branches.  On the other hand, if the party believed that its super-majority status was temporary, 
there might be an incentive to select realist judges who would continue to implement that party’s 
political agenda after it had lost the ability to do so through legislative and executive action. 
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best choice is unavailable, then you should select judges who are as 
close as possible to your position. 
 
II.     THE CASE FOR CHARACTER: AN ARETAIC THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
SELECTION 
 
Let us wipe the slate clean, and start over.  What case can be made 
for the consideration of character in judicial selection?  My answer to 
this question will begin very weak assumptions about the role of 
character in judging.  These weak assumptions lead to the conclusion 
that everyone, irrespective of their political ideology, has a good reason 
to care about certain character defects—which I call a “thin theory of 
judicial vice.”  I then argue that acceptance of the thin theory of judicial 
vice leads inexorably to a “thin theory of judicial virtues”—an account 
of those qualities necessary for excellent judging, irrespective of one’s 
views about political ideology.  This leads to a discussion of the virtue 
of justice, and the problems that this virtue poses for a character-
focused theory of judicial selection. 
 
A.     The Thin Theory of Judicial Vice 
 
Let us assume that humans have characters.36  More particularly, 
let us assume that humans have dispositional traits that incline them to 
behave in more or less predictable ways.  Our vocabulary is rich with 
words to describe such traits.  We use terms like “coward,” 
“procrastinator,” “reliable,” “hard-working,” “studious,” “curious,” 
“sensitive,” and so forth.  Following Aristotle, let us sort the traits, 
picking out those which we count as human excellences, “virtues,” and 
those which we count as defects, “vices.”  Let us set the virtues and any 
traits that are neutral to the side, and focus on the defects—traits like 
cowardice, gluttony, avariciousness, foolishness, and so forth. 
Are there judicial vices that should disqualify (or at least count 
against) judicial candidates irrespective of political ideology?  For 
example, are there vices that should lead a senator to vote against a 
 
 36 I should concede at the outset that this seemingly modest assumption is controversial 
among social scientists.  For a rich explication of the view that humans do not have robust 
dispositional traits, see JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL 
BEHAVIOR (2002).  Doris’s book is based on research by social psychologists.  In simple terms, 
situationalism is the view that human behavior is caused by the situations in which humans find 
themselves as opposed to human character traits.  For a brief introduction to these issues, see 
Lawrence B. Solum, Do Humans Have Character Traits?  A Comment on Situationalism, Moral 
Psychology, and Legal Theory, Legal Theory Blog, August 12, 2003, http://www.lsolum. 
blogspot.com/2003_08_01_lsolum_archive.html#106045570213167158. 
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candidate for judicial office, even though the candidate’s political 
ideology is in perfect agreement with the senator’s ideology?  Once 
asked, the question answers itself.  Of course, there are some 
characteristics that disqualify candidates from judicial office 
irrespective of political ideology.  Hardly anyone thinks that we should 
select corrupt or incompetent judges.37 
We can systematize the worst judicial vices, borrowing Aristotle’s 
distinction between intellectual and moral character traits.  There are 
two important intellectual vices that should disqualify candidates from 
judicial office.  The first of these is judicial stupidity.  Judges who 
suffer from this vice in its worst form lack the intelligence (and hence 
also the knowledge) necessary to do the complex intellectual work 
required of judges.  They do not know what the rules of law are, and 
they are unable to see how they could be applied in particular fact 
situations.  The second intellectual vice is judicial foolishness.  Even a 
very smart judge can have terrible practical judgment.  A foolish judge 
may know the law, but he cannot discern the difference between the 
rules that are important to the case and those that are only marginally 
relevant.  Foolish judges are as likely to make impractical demands as 
the lawyers and parties who appear before them. 
There are also moral vices that should disqualify a judge.  The 
most obvious of these is corruption.  Judges should not accept bribes.38  
Although judges are only infrequently in physical danger, they are more 
frequently faced with situations in which rendering the legally correct 
decision might injure their popularity, social standing, or opportunities 
for promotion or nonjudicial work.  Hence we should not select civil 
cowards for judicial office.  Judges are often placed in anger-inducing 
situations.  A judge who is prone to fly off the handle at small 
provocations is not likely to be effective in the courtroom, and hence we 
ought not to select the hot-tempered for judicial office. 
What I have offered is a thin theory of judicial vice.  This is a thin 
theory, because it rests on very weak39 assumptions about what counts 
as bad character.  So far as I can see, no sensible normative account of 
judicial selection provides good reasons to reject the normative 
implications of the thin theory of judicial vice.  No one wants stupid, 
 
 37 There are exceptions, of course.  Corrupt politicians may prefer corrupt judges for obvious 
reasons.  Similarly, if judicial offices are treated as patronage positions, then politicians may be 
willing to appoint incompetent judges.  Once we move to the normative realm, however, the 
reasons will normally become inoperative, because most normative theories of politics do not 
countenance corruption. 
 38 Notice that a judicial decision made because of a bribe is a bad decision, even if it is legally 
or ideologically correct.  Corrupt decisions undermine respect for the law, even if a virtuous judge 
would have reached the same decision. 
 39 By “weak assumptions,” I mean assumptions that are widely shared and relatively 
uncontroversial. 
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foolish, corrupt, cowardly, or hot-tempered judges.  Of course, these 
vices are not always apparent when candidates are nominated and 
confirmed for judicial office.  There are, I am afraid, some judges on the 
bench today who possess the full range of these vices. 
B.     The Thin Theory of Judicial Virtue 
 
The next step in my argument is simple.  If you accept the thin 
theory of judicial vice, you should also accept a thin theory of judicial 
virtue.  Why?  The basic reason is conceptual: virtue is required for the 
absence of vice.  To select a judge who lacks the intellectual defect of 
judicial stupidity, you must select a candidate who has the 
corresponding virtue of judicial intelligence.  To avoid civic cowardice, 
you must select a judge with the virtue of civic courage.  To avoid 
corruption, you must select a judge with the virtue of temperance.  To 
avoid ill temper, you must look for candidates who have judicial 
temperaments. 
Once we have agreed that we should avoid vicious judges, it 
follows that we should aim for virtuous judges.  Of course, so far we 
have only agreed on a thin theory of judicial virtue.  That is, we have 
only agreed that there are some excellences of intellect and will that are 
required for good judging that are more or less independent of political 
ideology or judicial philosophy. 
 
C.     The Difficulty with Moving Beyond a Thin Theory of Judicial 
Virtue 
 
Can we go further than a thin theory of judicial virtue?  Here is the 
difficulty.  Those who hold differing views on matters of political 
ideology and judicial philosophy have different ideas about the target 
that judges for which judges should aim.  Our crude two-dimensional 
model suggests that we can think of the target as a point on a plane 
defined by the spectrum of political ideology from left to right and of 
judicial philosophy from realist to formalist. 
Let us borrow an analogy from Aristotle and think of judges as 
archers.  In the usual sort of archery contest, there is a target which 
contains a mark or bull’s eye.  Everyone agrees about the location of the 
mark; it is plain for all to see.  The characteristics that make for a good 
archer are those which enable the archer to consistently hit the mark. 
But when it comes to judging, it seems that things are quite 
different.  We disagree about the placement of the mark.  Some of us 
(the realists) believe that the criterion by which the location of the bull’s 
eye is set by political ideology—and in particular, by the political 
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ideology which we personally affirm as correct.  Among the realists, 
there are some who think the mark is located on the left side of the 
target, others who think it is in the center, and still others who think it is 
on the right.  And, this does not exhaust the grounds for disagreement.  
Yet, others among us (the formalists) believe that the criteria which pick 
out the mark are the laws, the rules laid down.  And even among the 
formalists, there are disagreements about the role of text, purpose, 
precedent, and practical judgment in defining the target. 
If we all agreed about the mark, then we could all—at least in 
principle—agree on the answers to questions like: Who are the best 
judges?  What makes for excellence in judging?  But, what if we do not 
agree on the mark?  What then?  Consider this elaboration of the 
archery analogy: 
The Strange Archery Contest.  Imagine a strange archery contest.  
The archers shoot at targets mounted on stands, but no “mark” or 
“bull’s eye” is displayed on the target.  The contest is scored by 
officials who each have their own ideas about where the bull’s eye is 
located.  You are one of the officials.  You have your own opinion 
about the location of the mark.  Some archers will hit the mark at 
which they aimed every time, but miss your bull’s eye.  Other 
archers will aim at your mark, but because they lack the requisite 
skill, their arrows will rarely land close to that spot.  If the 
competition involves many trials and we score the archers by the 
distance between the spot at which their arrows hit the target and the 
place where the officials locate the mark, then your score card may 
rank some archers who have aimed at the wrong mark higher than 
those who were aiming at the mark you selected.  When all the 
scores are tallied, a given archer may score quite high on your card 
but very low on the card of another official.  If all the archers were of 
equal skill, the archer who aimed at your mark would win.  If they 
are of unequal skill, those who aim at marks close to yours will have 
an advantage.  The really bad archers—those who miss the target 
altogether—will not even be in the running.  If you believe the bull’s 
eye is located on the extreme right of the target, then you give poor 
marks to even the most skilled archers who are aiming at a mark on 
the extreme left. 
Our theories of judging and judicial virtue put us in a situation that 
is like the strange archery contest.  We can agree on a set of skills that 
enable judges to reliably hit the target at which they are aiming.  That 
set of skills defines a thin theory of the judicial virtues.  We may even 
be able to reach agreement about the general shape and location of the 
target.  Even those who are thoroughly instrumentalist about the law are 
likely to reject radical indeterminacy; most legal realists accept that the 
legal sources define a range of legally plausible outcomes, and that 
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instrumentalism operates with these.40  This zone of agreement enables 
us to agree that some potential judges are so bad that they are not 
qualified to serve. 
We can agree that judges need a minimal set of judicial virtues—
otherwise they will miss the target altogether.  But, we can agree on 
more than that.  Among judges who are aiming at the correct mark or at 
a point that is near enough, we can agree that some are more skillful 
than others, and that the most skillful of these are the best judges. 
But, it is at this point that disagreement begins to arise.  If I believe 
that the mark is on the right, then as far as I am concerned the very 
skillful judges who aim at the left are among worst judges—assuming 
we set aside those few judges who are incompetent, corrupt, or vicious 
in some other way.  Within the group of judges with whom I agree 
about the mark, skill is positively correlated with excellence.  Within 
the group of judges with whom I strongly disagree about the mark, skill 
is negatively correlated with excellence.  Put more plainly, if I am on 
the right, I prefer a modestly competent left-wing judge to a superstar 
right-wing judge. 
This is a crucial point in the argument.  This is at this point in the 
dialectic that many contemporary legal theorists believe that theories of 
judicial virtue run out of gas.  They are willing to accept a thin theory of 
judicial virtue, and to use the worst judicial vices as an initial test in the 
judicial selection process.  But after that, ideology takes over as the 
primary test. 
 
D.     The Virtue of Justice 
 
Is this right?  In the process of judging, is the concept of virtue 
incapable of telling us anything about the target of good judging?  To 
answer these questions, we need to consider a virtue that we have so far 
neglected—the virtue of justice. 
A judge who possesses the virtue of justice sees the mark rightly.  
A judge who possesses the virtue of justice in combination with all the 
rest will reliably hit the mark.  In the strange archery contest, each 
scorer seemed to define her own mark arbitrarily.  But in the case of 
judging legal disputes, that is surely not right.  The mark is not defined 
arbitrarily.  Some results are just.  Some are unjust.  A judge with the 
virtue of justice aims at just results.  Indeed, we call the judges of our 
highest courts “justices” and we call the buildings in which they do their 
 
 40 That is, most instrumentalists (or legal realists as I have been using that phrase) believe that 
the law underdetermines the results in particular cases and that policy or ideology then selects 
among those outcomes which can be legally justified.  See Lawrence B. Solum, On the 
Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). 
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work “halls of justice.” 
The account of the virtue of justice that I have offered is formal 
and not substantive.  Because my account is formal, it relocates but does 
not resolve disputes about the proper aim of judging.  The left and the 
right will disagree about who has the virtue of justice and who does not.  
The left will call right-wing judges unjust, while the right will label the 
very same judges as paragons of the virtue of justice. 
Moreover, there is a deeper problem here.  If the virtue of justice is 
simply the disposition to aim at just results, then it would seem that 
what does the real work is having the correct beliefs about justice.  If I 
have the correct beliefs and the other judicial virtues, then I ought to be 
able to hit the mark.  If I lack the correct beliefs, then I will aim at the 
wrong mark and possession of the other virtues only serves to insure 
that I will miss the true target. 
My point is not that we cannot talk meaningfully about a virtue of 
justice.  Rather, my point is that the story we have told about justice 
makes this virtue unlike the rest.  The intellectual virtues (theoretical 
and practical wisdom) and moral virtues (courage, good temper) seem to 
be rooted in the fabric of the person—their intellectual and moral 
equipment.  But, the virtue of justice seems to be a matter of belief, not 
of character, per se.  Ideologies are collections of beliefs about what is 
just and unjust.  So possession of the virtue of justice would seem to 
depend on having the correct political ideology.  Because the virtue of 
justice determines the target for judging, justice is, in a sense, the most 
important of the judicial virtues.  So it would seem that our investigation 
of judicial character has led us round again to the conclusion that 
ideology and not character should be the primary factor in judicial 
selection.  Yes, the other judicial virtues count.  And yes, they may even 
be essential prerequisites for good judging, but in the end it is ideology 
that seems to be the most important factor. 
But, are things as they seem? 
 
III.     THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE AS LAWFULNESS 
 
I have done my best to lay out the case for the ideological selection 
of judges and the case against selection that is primarily based on 
character.  But at this point, my argument will turn in a new direction, 
toward a conception of the virtue of justice that is rooted in the 
importance of the rule of law. 
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A.     Judicial Philosophy as an End Rather than as a Means Only 
 
You will recall that our simple model of judicial dispositions and 
attitudes had two dimensions, political ideology and judicial 
philosophy.  I suggested that we could plot judicial philosophy on a 
spectrum that ran from realist to formalist.  But when it came to my 
story about the goals of those who selected judges, I assumed that their 
position could be captured entirely by the left-to-right political ideology 
line.  The selectors took the judicial philosophies of judges into account 
when evaluating them, but only because judicial philosophy influences 
the extent to which a judge would render decisions consistent with a 
given political ideology.  That is, I assumed that the political actors who 
select judges (presidents and senators) viewed judicial philosophy as a 
means to ends defined solely by political ideology. 
But, is that assumption correct?  The alternative is that we ought to 
consider judicial philosophy as a criterion by which to evaluate the 
outcomes produced by the judicial selection process.  That is, we might 
believe that judges who decide the cases before them on the basis of the 
law rather than their political ideologies are doing the right thing.  But, 
why would we believe that? 
The case for legal formalism cannot easily be made in the span of a 
few pages or minutes.  But, we are all already familiar with the outlines 
of that case.  It rests on the values we associate with the rule of law.  
What are those?  Briefly: 
• Stability and certainty.  Decision according to law as 
opposed to political ideology enhances the predictability 
and certainty of the law.  Such predictability and certainty 
enables individuals, organizations, and firms to plan and 
reduces the cost of insurance against risk. 
• Neutral arbitration of disputes about the rules of the game.  
Decision according to law as opposed to political ideology 
enables the judiciary to act as a referee or neutral party in 
disputes about the secondary rules (election law, 
constitutional allocations of power, etc.) that enable legal 
change.  Judging aimed at advancing political ideology 
naturally conceives of these disputes about the rules of the 
game as part of the game itself.  An ideological judge will 
use election law to rig elections for her own faction.  The 
absence of any neutral third-party with power to define the 
rules of the game creates the risk that losers will perceive 
outcomes as fundamentally illegitimate and such 
perceptions can, in the long run, lead to political instability. 
• Improbability of long-run benefit from ideological judging.  
Decision according to law as opposed to political ideology 
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may well be as good in the long run as the feasible 
alternatives even from the perspective of those who believe 
that the outcomes of political processes must ultimately be 
measured against an ideological yardstick.  Our simple 
model of the judicial process hinted at the reason.  Unless 
one ideological faction believes that it is likely to obtain 
long-run control of the judicial selection process, the 
ideological selection of judges is unlikely to favor one side 
or the other over the long run.  For every period in which 
the left is able to dominate the selection process and 
appoint left-realists, there is likely to be a corresponding 
period in which the right will make similar gains.  In 
periods when each side can block the other, selection will 
favor centrist or formalist judges even though this is the 
first choice of neither party. 
If these arguments are correct, then we have reasons to prefer 
formalist judges over realist judges.  In the abstract, these reasons are of 
equal force for those of widely varying political orientations.41 
 
B.     Formalism and Justice as Lawfulness 
 
Grant me, arguendo, that there may be a case for the rule of law 
that could form the basis for an overlapping consensus between 
adherents of a variety of political ideologies.42  If we take the distinction 
between law making and law application seriously, what are the 
implications for the virtue of justice?  Put another way, if legal 
formalism offers the best theory of judging, what are the implications 
for our conception of the virtue of justice? 
Here is the first approximation to an answer to these questions: the 
 
 41 There are, however, circumstances in which some political groups might reject the third 
argument.  One way to slice the political pie is in terms of a divide between conservatives (who 
want to keep things as they are) and progressives (who want things to change).  If the existing 
constitutional order is constituted by secondary rules that are biased against change, then 
progressives may come to believe that realist judging is better than formalist judging in the long 
run.  This will especially be true if conservatives tend to appoint formalist judges when given the 
opportunity to do so.  This might result in the so-called one-way ratchet, where periods of realist 
judging move the political order in a progressive direction while periods of formalist judging 
consolidate and institutionalize these changes.  Over the long haul, this pattern would favor 
progressives over conservatives.  If conservatives became aware of this pattern, however, the 
periods of conservative domination of the selection process might result in the appointment of 
realist-conservative judges, who would attempt to roll back progressive decisions.  If the pattern 
changes in this way, it would no longer be clear that progressives would benefit from realist 
judging. 
 42 As framed, my argument addresses only those who adhere to political ideologies that could 
form part of an overlapping consensus on the great value of the rule of law and accept formalist 
theory of judging. 
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virtue of justice is the disposition to decide according to law, as opposed 
to one’s political ideology or beliefs about what the law should be.  A 
judge with the virtue of justice gives the parties what they are due under 
the rules laid down. 
This formalist idea of the virtue of justice is not unfamiliar.  
Indeed, the notion that justice requires decision according to law is one 
of the oldest ideas in legal theory.  Even legal realists (or most of them) 
accept the rule-of-law conception of the virtue of justice as an outer 
limit on judicial power.  Moreover, this conception of the rule of law 
plays a powerful role in the judicial selection process.  This is reflected 
in the ritual question and answer in confirmation hearings: 
SENATOR: Will you apply the law as it is written?  Or do you 
regard yourself as free to make law? 
CANDIDATE: Senator, I regard myself as bound to apply the law as 
it is written.  It would be improper for me to make the law.  That’s 
the job of the legislature. 
Sophisticates regard these exchanges as mere rhetoric.  Washed in 
cynical acid—says the legal realist—this exchange is hypocritical.  Both 
the senator and the candidate know that that judges make the law. 
My suggestion is that this is not and should not be the case.  There 
is nothing in the fabric of the universe that requires a realist practice of 
judging.  Judges can (within broad limits) be realists or formalists.  But 
whether a particular judge will be a realist or formalist depends not 
solely on the judge’s “judicial philosophy,” her normative beliefs and 
attitudes towards theories of judging.  Whether a particular judge will 
be a realist or a formalist depends also on her character—on her ability 
to hold her own opinions and desires in check and follow the law and 
customs of her community instead. 
In the language of virtue jurisprudence, we might say that the good 
judge must have the virtue of fidelity to law and concern for the 
coherence of law.  Let us call this “justice as lawfulness.”  In 
conceptualizing the idea that justice as lawfulness is a virtue, it is 
helpful to examine Aristotle’s account of the relationship between 
justice and lawfulness.  To begin, we need to say a bit about the Greek 
word nomos, which is translated as “law.”  The eminent Aristotle 
scholar, Richard Kraut explains: 
[W]hen [Aristotle] says that a just person, speaking in the broadest 
sense, is nominos, he is attributing to such a person a certain 
relationship to the laws, norms, and customs generally accepted by 
some existing community.  Justice has to do not merely with the 
written enactments of a community’s lawmakers, but with the wider 
set of norms that govern the members of that community.  Similarly, 
the unjust person’s character is expressed not only in his violations 
of the written code of laws, but more broadly, in his transgression of 
the rules accepted by the society in which he lives. 
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  There is another important way in which Aristotle’s use of the 
term nomos differs from our word ‘law’: he makes a distinction 
between nomoi and what the Greeks of his time called 
psēphismata—conventionally translated as ‘decrees.’  A decree is a 
legal enactment addressed solely to present circumstances, and sets 
no precedent that applies to similar cases in the future.  By contrast, a 
nomos is meant to have general scope: it applies not only to cases at 
hand but to a general category of cases that can be expected to occur 
in the future.43 
Rule by decree, Aristotle believed, was typical of tyranny—the 
rule of individuals and not of law; a regime that rules by decree does not 
provide the stability and certainty that is required for human 
communities to flourish.44  Kraut continues: 
We can now . . . see why Aristotle thinks that justice in its broadest 
sense can be defined as lawfulness, and why he has such high regard 
for a lawful person.  His definition embodies the assumption that 
every community requires the high degree of order that that comes 
from having a stable body of customs and norms, and a coherent 
legal code that is not altered frivolously and unpredictably.  Justice 
in its broadest sense is the intellectual and emotional skill one needs 
in order to do one’s part in bringing it about that one’s community 
possesses this stable system of rules and laws.45 
Once we understand Aristotle in this way, it become apparent that 
the idea that the virtue of justice consists in holding the correct political 
ideology is topsy turvey.  If each constitutional adjudicator acts on the 
basis of her own theory of justice—her own political ideology—then 
constitutional adjudication will become an ideological struggle, with the 
content of the law shifting with the political winds.  Aristotle’s view is 
quite different.  The excellent judge is a nominos, someone who grasps 
the importance of lawfulness and acts on the basis of the laws and 
norms of her community. 
 
C.     Fairness versus Lawfulness 
 
But at this stage of the argument, there will surely be objections.  
The virtue of justice—one objection might begin—is not exhausted by 
the idea of lawfulness.  Even if we concede that in ordinary cases, 
justice requires adherence to the law, there are surely extraordinary 
cases—cases where we think of justice not as lawfulness but instead as 
fairness.  One version of this objection simply rejects the idea of justice 
as lawfulness tout court.  That is, it might be argued that judges should 
 
 43 RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 105-06 (2002). 
 44 Id. at 106. 
 45 Id. 
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never follow the law when the law conflicts with the judge’s own sense 
of fairness.  Whatever the merits of this argument in the context of a 
society where there was very little disagreement about what fairness 
requires, it is a nonstarter in the context of a society—like our own—
that is characterized by deep and persistent pluralism about fairness.  In 
such a society, if each judge follows her own notions of fairness, then 
law will simply not be able to do the job of coordinating behavior and 
avoiding conflict. 
But, the objection to the claim that justice is exhausted by 
lawfulness can be expressed more modestly.  One version of this 
objection might focus on the idea that the law is cast in abstract and 
general rules that may lead to results that are unfair in particular cases.  
A virtuous judge—the objector might argue—needs to have a keen 
sense of fairness, so as to be able to do justice in the cases where simply 
following the rules laid down would lead to absurd and unintended 
consequences. 
But of course, this version of the objection to justice as lawfulness 
was anticipated by Aristotle.  In V.10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, 
Aristotle wrote: 
What causes the difficulty is the fact that equity is just, but not what 
is legally just: it is a rectification of legal justice.  The explanation of 
this is that all law is universal, and there are some things about which 
it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general terms; therefore in 
cases where it is necessary to make a general pronouncement, but 
impossible to do so rightly, the law takes account of the majority of 
cases, though not unaware that in this way errors are made.  And the 
law is none the less right; because the error lies not in the law nor in 
the legislator, but in the nature of the case; for the raw material of 
human behaviour is essentially of this kind.46 
This is the core of Aristotle’s view of epieikeia, usually translated 
as equity or fair-mindedness.  As Roger Shiner puts it: “Equity is the 
virtue shown by one particular kind of agent—a judge—when making 
practical judgments in the face of the limitations of one particular kind 
of practical rule—those hardened customs and written laws that 
constitute for some society the institutionalized system of norms that is 
its legal system.”47 
For our limited purposes, the important question is: “Must a judge 
adhere to the correct political ideology in order to do equity?”  A 
negative answer to this question is, at the very least, plausible.  
Aristotle’s point is not that equity is opposed to lawfulness.  Rather, 
 
 46 ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1137a35-1137b24 
(J.A.K. Thomson trans., Hugh Tredennick rev. 1976). 
 47 See Roger Shiner, Aristotle’s Theory of Equity, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1260-61 
(1994). 
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doing equity is being true to the spirit of the law, even when we depart 
from the letter of the law.  That is, equity can only be done by a 
phronimos who is also nominos.  Doing equity requires that one grasp 
the nomos, the laws, norms, and customs generally accepted by the 
community. 
There is another version of the objection to justice as lawfulness.  
Suppose that we live in a radically dysfunctional society, one that has 
gone so badly wrong that the laws do not operate to promote the 
flourishing of human individuals and their communities.  What to say 
about this special case is one of the deepest and most interesting 
questions for virtue jurisprudence, and a satisfactory analysis is far 
beyond the scope of this essay.  But, I can gesture in the direction of an 
aretaic account of virtuous action in the radically dysfunctional society.  
That essence of the gesture is the observation that in such a society, it is 
not clear that there will be nomos in the Aristotelian sense.  This is not 
to say that there will not be statutes, ordinances, and decrees in a 
radically dysfunctional society.  And, it may be a matter of some 
controversy whether such decrees are “law,” with legal positivists 
maintaining that they are “law” and natural lawyers taking the position 
that they are not.  Whatever the resolution of that debate, the laws of a 
radically dysfunctional society are unlikely to be nomos in the fullest 
sense of that term.  A phronimos who is also nominos may well take the 
position that the decrees of the regime in a radically dysfunctional 
society lack the normative force of the laws which express the nomos of 
a society that is reasonably well functioning. 
So this brings us round to our original question.  As we have seen, 
there is a sense in which the dichotomy between character and ideology 
in judicial selection is a false one.  On the one hand, even those who 
believe that political ideology should drive judicial selection should 
accept that character is important in two senses: (1) vicious candidates 
should not be selected as judges; and (2) among those with the correct 
ideology, those with the most virtue will be the best judges.  On the 
other hand, even those who believe that character should drive the 
judicial selection process must concede that ideology is relevant to 
judicial selection.  At the very least, a candidate’s judicial philosophy 
ought to be considered.  But, there is also a sense in which dispute about 
the primacy of character or ideology reflects a real difference in views 
about general jurisprudence.  If one accepts that the very great 
importance of the rule of law values leads to the conclusion that legal 
formalism is the best normative theory of judging, then there is a 
meaningful sense in which judges should be selected on the basis of 
their character and not their political ideology. 
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IV.     OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS 
 
What are the drawbacks to making the aretaic turn in judicial 
selection?  This Part considers a variety of arguments that have been put 
forth against consideration of character in judicial selection. 
 
A.    The Insufficient Evidence Objection 
 
Aretaic judicial selection requires that presidents and senators have 
access to evidence of the virtues and vices of candidates for judicial 
office.  Michael Gerhardt has argued that such evidence is unavailable 
or unreliable: 
[F]ocus [on character] is bound to make such confirmations messier 
because it will invite a nominee’s opponents to do whatever they can 
to taint her reputation.  One benefit of focusing on a nominee’s 
ideology is that it usually turns on some sort of documentation.  If 
the focus were on a nominee’s moral disposition, much of the debate 
is bound to turn on perceptions or even on swearing contests between 
conflicting character witnesses about private conduct with arguably 
public implications—something, say, on the order of the second 
phase of the Thomas hearings.48 
Before taking this objection head on, we should note that it is not 
always so easy to confirm the ideology of particular candidates.  Harry 
Blackmun, David Souter, and John Paul Stevens were nominated by 
conservative republicans, but might well be counted as Supreme Court 
liberals.49 
The real point of the evidentiary objection is based on the idea that 
the judicial virtues and vices may not be revealed in candidates without 
judicial experience.  One obvious rejoinder is to take this evidentiary 
problem into account in the nomination process.  Ordinarily, important 
judgeships should be filled by candidates who have relevant judicial 
experience.  Supreme Court vacancies should be filled by candidates 
who have served on a state court of last resort or on the United States 
Court of Appeals.  Of course, some candidates without such experience 
may nonetheless have displayed their possession of the relevant virtues 
in some other context.  The point is that the evidentiary objection 
suggests that judicial selection should take the availability of relevant 
evidence into account.  The difficulty of obtaining such evidence is not 
a good argument for simply ignoring judicial excellence altogether. 
Finally and decisively, the possibility of evidentiary insufficiency 
 
 48 Michael Gerhardt, The Confirmation Mystery, 83 GEO. L.J. 395, 423 (1994). 
 49 See WATSON & STOOKEY, supra note 1, at 69-71. 
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should not rule out consideration of character in those cases where 
evidence is available.  Surely, no one would argue that the infamous 
former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals Sol Wachtler 
should have been selected to fill a vacancy on the United States 
Supreme Court; his pattern of abuse of judicial power, which led to his 
resignation and imprisonment, betokened a serious character flaw.50  
Likewise, few would maintain that Judge Learned Hand’s consistent 
display of the virtues of judicial intelligence and wisdom would not 
count in favor of his elevation to the nation’s highest court.51 
 
B.     The Lack of Criteria Objection 
 
Even if evidence of character is sometimes available, the aretaic 
turn would be impossible if there were not criteria for what constitutes 
judicial virtue and judicial vice and how it should be weighted in the 
selection process.  Michael Gerhardt seems to be making a version of 
this objection in the following passage: 
Although good moral character might seem essential for someone to 
become a Supreme Court Justice, no agreement on what constitutes 
good moral character exists, and it is hard to say whether this quality 
should displace or take priority over whether the nominee has proven 
excellence in a relevant area of the law, demonstrated leadership or 
negotiation skills, or engaged in significant public service.  In fact, 
some of the people who are commonly viewed as great Supreme 
Court Justices arguably lacked the “right kind of moral instincts.”  
For example, Hugo Black had been a member of the Ku Klux Klan, 
and Earl Warren arguably knew that his order to detain Japanese-
Americans, given during his tenure as California’s Attorney General, 
had a dubious legal basis.52 
As applied to the position developed in this paper (a purpose that 
Gerhardt did not have in mind), this objection would be seriously 
underdeveloped.  First, there is every indication that criteria for what 
counts as good character can be developed in the form of a theory of 
judicial virtue and vice.  And, the prototype of such a theory has been 
offered here and elsewhere.53  Second, to make good on the thesis 
implied by the examples of Black and Warren, Gerhardt would have to 
show that the incidents in question truly were indications of bad 
character and that Black and Warren were truly excellent judges.  My 
 
 50 JOHN M. CAHER, KING OF THE MOUNTAIN: THE RISE, FALL, AND REDEMPTION OF CHIEF 
JUDGE SOL WACHTLER (1998). 
 51 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994). 
 52 See Gerhardt, supra note 48, at 423-24. 
 53 See Solum, supra note 8; Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence, supra note 11; Solum, Equity and 
the Rule of Law, supra note 11. 
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suspicion is that in the case of Black, the early flirtation with the Klan 
was based on ignorance and that in the case of Warren, there is a real 
question as to whether he was a truly excellent judge.  Third, and most 
importantly, a lack of current consensus about the criterion for judicial 
virtue and vice should not, by itself, count as an argument against an 
aretaic approach to judicial selection.  No theory of judicial selection 
commands a current consensus.  At the normative level, this leaves open 
the question whether particular theories are nonetheless correct.  At the 
level of practical politics, the lack of current consensus leaves open the 
question whether the aretaic turn is politically feasible—a question to 
which we will turn in due course. 
 
C.     Judicial Virtue and “Personal” Morality 
 
A third objection to the consideration of character in judicial 
selection is based on a distinction between the public realm of law and 
political ideology and the private realm of personal values and 
individual character.  Judicial selection—this objection would 
maintain—should focus on the public and exclude consideration of the 
private.  Again, Michael Gerhardt gives voice to the objection: 
[A character-based] approach would allow senators to evaluate a 
nominee based on their agreement with her lifestyle choices, 
although . . . these decisions are constitutionally protected and none 
of the government’s business.  Furthermore, focusing on a nominee’s 
moral character contradicts [a] desire to distinguish constitutional 
interpretation from personal preference: if the Senate focuses on the 
moral implications of a nominee’s personal choices, the public may 
figure that no meaningful distinction between constitutional 
interpretation and personal preference exists.54 
This objection has no force against the theory of judicial character 
sketched in this Essay.  The judicial virtues and vices are directly 
relevant to judicial performance.  In particular, selection of judges for 
the virtue of justice as lawfulness is precisely aimed at creating a 
“meaningful distinction between constitutional interpretation and 
personal preference.” 
 
D.     The Feasibility Objection 
 
Is a character-based approach to judicial selection feasible?  In 
particular, is it politically feasible?55  It might be argued that the 
 
 54 See Gerhardt, supra note 48, at 424-25. 
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political ideology genie is already out of the bottle.  Once the process of 
judicial selection has become politicized, the argument might go, it will 
be difficult to move back to a character-based approach to judicial 
selection.  Once presidents and senators have begun to battle for the 
selection of realist judges who share their political ideologies, what 
could make them forgo this political strategy?  Isn’t the hope for a 
return to character as the basis for judicial selection pie in the sky? 
The full answer to the feasibility question is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but I can gesture towards an answer by recalling a point that 
we have already made.  We have already seen how presidents and 
senators who aim at selecting realist judges who share their political 
ideologies might end-up compromising on formalist judges.  Unless one 
party (or ideological faction) controls both the presidency and a super-
majority of the Senate, either party can block judicial selection.  
Compromise will be necessary to avoid stalemate, and formalist judges 
are likely to be in the set upon which the acceptability frontiers of the 
left and right overlap. 
If we return to our two-dimensional model of judicial selection, we 
can plot the position of judges who are nominos.  On the 
formalist/ideology axis a nominos will score be close to the formalist 
endpoint of the scale.  On the left/right axis, a nominos will be within 
the range of political opinion that is consistent with the basic social 
norms of the society.  The best representation of this requirement would 
place the nominos judge away from the extremes of left and right that 
would imply a rejection of those norms that have general social 
acceptance.  This picture is represented by Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7      The Nominos on the Two-Dimensional Model 
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Insofar as the issue of feasibility is concerned, the crucial point is 
that candidates who are nominos are likely to be in the confirmation 
space, where neither left nor right would veto the candidate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
I doubt these brief remarks will convince anyone who believes that 
judges should be selected on the basis of political ideology.  Rather, I 
hope to have convinced you that the case for character-based selection 
of judges could be right, even if one accepts that political actors ought 
to seek to advance their political ideologies through the law.  My aim is 
the very modest one of showing that there can be reasonable 
disagreement about the question whether ideology or character should 
be the primary criterion for judicial selection. 
Let me end by observing an ironic feature of the argument that I 
have made.  It is the fact of ideological struggle that makes 
nonideological judging necessary to realize the rule of law.  It is the 
strife between opposing political ideologies that necessitates a neutral 
forum in which the rules that contain the struggle can be enforced.  It is 
precisely because political ideology is so important that judges should 
be selected for their possession of the virtue of justice—the disposition 
to decide on the basis of the rules laid down rather than on the basis of 
their political preferences. 
